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The 9/11 attacks in the United States, as well as other attacks in different parts of the world, raise important
questions related to the economic impact of terrorism. What are the most effective ways for a country
to recover from these economic losses? Who should pay for the costs of future large-scale attacks?
 
To address these two questions, we propose five principles to evaluate alternative programs. We first
discuss how a federal insurance program with mandatory coverage and a laissez faire free-market
approach for providing private insurance will fare relative to these principles. We conclude that neither
solution is likely to be feasible here in the United States given the millions of firms at risk and the
current structure of insurance regulation. 
 
We then evaluate how well the U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), a public-private program
to cover commercial enterprises against foreign terrorism on U.S. soil, meets the five principles. In
particular, we show that TRIA has had a positive effect on availability of terrorism coverage and also has
significantly contributed to reducing insurance premiums. 
 
TRIA is scheduled to terminate at the end of the year, but pending legislation would extend the program
for fifteen years after December 31 (HR. 2761). In this paper, we show that such a long-term extension
might have important impacts on the market. This could increase the take-up rate, as prices might
be even lower than they are today. We show also, however, that if TRIA were extended for a long
period of time in its current form, some insurers could "game" the program by collecting ex ante a
large amount of premiums for terrorism insurance, while being financially responsible for only a small
portion of the claims ex post. The general taxpayer and the general commercial policyholder (whether
or not covered against terrorism) would absorb the residual insured losses. This raises major equity
issues inherent in the design of the program.
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The nature of international terrorism has radically changed over the past 20 years 
and is now well accepted with a large portion of extremist religious and other groups 
seeking to inflict fear, mass-casualties and maximum disruption to western nations’ social 
and economic continuity and operating internationally (Enders and Sandler, 2006). Quite 
surprisingly, however, even after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 
and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, terrorism was still included as an unnamed 
peril in most commercial policies in the United States. Insurers did not view either 
international or domestic terrorism as a risk that should be explicitly considered when 
pricing their commercial insurance policies, principally because losses from terrorism 
had historically been small and, to a large degree, uncorrelated.  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, killed over 3,000 people from over  
90 countries and inflicted insured losses currently estimated at $37 billion (in 2007 
prices) that was shared by nearly 150 insurers and reinsurers worldwide. Reinsurers 
(most of them European) were financially responsible for about two-thirds of these 
losses. These reinsurance payments came in the wake of outlays triggered by a series of 
catastrophic natural disasters over the past decade and portfolio losses due to stock 
market declines. With their capital base severely hit, most reinsurers decided to reduce 
their terrorism coverage drastically or even stop covering this risk.  
Hence, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, insurers operating in 
the U.S. found themselves with significant amounts of terrorism exposure in their 
existing portfolio with limited possibilities of obtaining reinsurance to reduce the losses 
from a future attack. Most of them decided to stop covering terrorism. By early 2002,    
45 states permitted insurance companies to exclude terrorism from their policies, except 
for workers’ compensation insurance policies that cover occupational injuries without 
regard to the peril that caused the injury (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 
2002). Due to the difficulty in purchasing terrorism insurance, some private sector groups 
called for federal intervention. Most notably, the construction and real estate industries 
claimed that the lack of available terrorism coverage delayed or prevented projects from 
going forward because of concerns by lenders or investors (U.S. GAO, 2002).  
 
Political pressure from these groups led Congress to pass the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) (U.S. Congress, 2002),
  a $100 billion risk-sharing 
arrangement between the insurance industry, all commercial policyholders and the 
federal government.
1 One specific feature of TRIA is that the law required insurers to 
offer coverage to all their clients, who could then accept or refuse to purchase it. TRIA 
was originally designed as a 3-year program but was extended for two additional years at 
the end of 2005. Congress is currently discussing a fifteen-year extension of the Act in a 
form similar to TRIA (HR. 2761)
2. 
                                                 
1 The complete version of the Act can be downloaded at: http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/claims_process/program.shtml 
2 A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report provides a series of cost estimates for expected 
federal expenditures under this proposed bill (CBO, 2007-b)   
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As illustrated by the events of March 11, 2004 in Madrid, and the July 7, 2005 
attacks in London and the bomb threats in the United Kingdom at the end of June 2007, 
the terrorism risk is likely to remain with us for the indefinite future. While a lot of 
attention, energy and money have been devoted to prevent another attack on U.S. soil, 
important other questions have to be considered relating to the economic impact of future 
successful large-scale attacks. What are the roles and responsibilities of the private and 
public sectors in providing potential victims (people and firms) with adequate coverage 
against acts of terrorism?
3  What is the best way to assure the economic continuity of a 
country in the wake of large-scale terrorist attacks? Who will pay for the economic losses 
associated with future attacks?  
This paper discusses the challenges in defining an economically effective, 
equitable, and sustainable solution to address terrorism risk financing when there is 
dynamic uncertainty associated with the threat and the potential for devastating losses. 
Proposed solutions can range from no insurance with state and federal funding to victims 
ex post, to an unfettered insurance market where prices and risk sharing are determined 
ex ante by the laws of supply and demand. In practice, there are limitations to solutions 
where either the public or private sector provides coverage alone. In fact, none of the 
terrorism insurance programs developed or modified after 9/11 in OECD countries has 
adopted either of these one-sided solutions, nor do they follow the same risk-sharing 
arrangement, due to differences in the perceived nature of the threat and different cultural 
and institutional arrangements. (OECD, 2005; Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2005 and 
2006). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 proposes a set of principles by which 
to evaluate different national risk-sharing solutions. Section 3 indicates special features 
of the terrorism risk that must be considered in applying these principles. Section 4 
examines two proposals for sharing the risks of terrorism at opposite ends of the 
spectrum: a federal insurance program with mandatory coverage similar to the one 
currently in place in the U.S. for providing commercial airlines with terrorism third party 
liability insurance, and a laissez faire approach allowing private insurance market to 
operate without any federal intervention. We also provide a rationale as to why neither of 
these solutions has emerged in the United States to cover commercial enterprises against 
terrorism risks. Section 5 details the loss-sharing process between insurers, policyholders 
and taxpayers under the current terrorism insurance program, TRIA. Section 6 evaluates 
how well TRIA is likely to fare using the above principles, including the potential effect 
of a long term extension of the program as proposed in pending legislation. The paper 
concludes with a summary of our key findings and suggestions for future needed 
research.  
 
                                                 
3 On that question see Sykes and Gron, 2002;  Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004; Smetters, 2004; 
Brown, Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2004; Jaffee, 2005; Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2005; Jaffee and 
Russell, 2005; Cummins, 2005; Dixon and Reville, 2006; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2007-a.    
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2.  Principles for Guiding Risk-Sharing Arrangements  
 
We propose the following five principles for evaluating insurance and other risk 
transfer programs for providing financial protection against any specific risk:  
 
Risk-based Premiums:  Insurance and other risk transfer programs’ premiums should 
reflect the risk. The premiums will then signal to individuals and firms the hazards they 
face and encourage them to engage in cost-effective mitigation measures to reduce their 
vulnerability to catastrophes. 
Sufficient Demand for Coverage:  The demand by individuals and firms for insurance 
coverage with risk-based premiums should be sufficiently high so that insurers can cover 
the fixed costs of introducing a program for providing coverage and spreading the risk 
broadly through their portfolios.   
Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency:  Insurers and reinsurers should determine how 
much coverage to offer, and what premium to charge against the risk, so that the chances 
of insolvency are below some predefined acceptable threshold level. 
Equitability:  Insurance and other risk transfer programs should be fair to insurers, 
reinsurers, policyholders, and the general taxpayer where there is government 
participation.  
Minimize Gaming:    There should be no economic incentive for some insurers or 
policyholders to take advantage of provisions in the insurance or risk transfer program by 
undertaking strategic behavior. 
 
3. Special Features of Terrorism 
 
  These five principles can be used to design risk-sharing contracts for risks where 
there is considerable historical data and scientific information, such as automobile 
accidents, fire and life insurance, and even natural hazards. Estimating the risk of 
terrorism presents special challenges, however, which makes it difficult for private 
insurers to provide widespread coverage to commercial enterprises. The factors listed 
below increase the amount of capital that insurers must hold to provide terrorism risk 
insurance coverage, sometimes to a point where insurers will find it financially 
unattractive to provide coverage, unless they are required to do so.   
 
Potential for Catastrophic Losses from Terrorism     
After the 9/11 events, insurers are concerned that catastrophic losses from future 
terrorist attacks would have a severe negative impact on their surplus and possibly lead to 
insolvency. Empirical evidence provided by experts on terrorism threats supports their 
concerns. Results of simulations of conventional attacks using truck bombs presented in 
Appendix 2 demonstrate that a large attack against high-rise buildings could inflict losses 
of about $12-15 billion for a single building. A series of simultaneous attacks could then 
produce losses far exceeding those of September 11, 2001.    
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Unconventional attacks using nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological 
(NBCR) weapons have the potential of inflicting much larger insured losses, especially 
on workers’ compensation and business interruption lines. The bombing of a chlorine 
tank in Washington, DC could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of people. Plausible 
scenarios elaborated by Risk Management Solutions, one of the three leading modeling 
firms examining catastrophe risks, indicate that large-scale anthrax attacks on New York 
City could cost between $30 and $90 billion in insured losses (Towers Perrin, 2004).   
A recent RAND study examined the impact of NBCR attacks on the losses to 
insurers and other interested parties from different scenarios (Dixon et al., 2007). The 
report presents the results of simulations for six attack scenarios: two conventional ones 
(1- and 10-ton truck bombs) and four NBCR scenarios such as a 5-kiloton nuclear bomb 
and an attack using a radiological device in the same metropolitan area. The report 
concludes that a 5-kiloton nuclear bomb would inflict losses of $630 billion dollars to 
commercial property and workers’ compensation. A 2006 GAO report, written for the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, concludes that “Given the 
challenges faced by insurers in providing coverage for, and pricing NBCR risks, any 
purely market-driven expansion of coverage is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.” 
(US GAO, 2006). 
The 9/11 events, as well as the anthrax attacks in the month thereafter, also 
demonstrated a new kind of vulnerability: the use of networks as “weapons of mass 
disruption” (Michel-Kerjan, 2003-a). Terrorists can use the capacity of a country’s 
critical networks to have a large-scale impact on the nation. In any given network (e.g., 
transportation) — every aircraft, every piece of mail, every marine container — can 
become a potential weapon. The impact of a supply chain disruption on the retail industry 
could be financially catastrophic should the federal government order a major port to be 
shut down in the wake of potential or actual threats from contaminated containers. As a 
point of reference, a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb planted in a shipping container that 
explodes in the port of Long Beach, California, could inflict total direct costs estimated to 
exceed $1 trillion, not to mention the ripple effects on trade and global supply chains that 
could even produce a global recession (Meade and Molander, 2006). 
Are these scenarios likely? According to experts in nuclear security and non-
proliferation, they might very well be. A 2005 survey of 85 non-proliferation and national 
security experts led by Senator Richard Lugar put the likelihood of a nuclear attack 
somewhere in the world within the next ten years at 20 percent and the likelihood of a 
radiological attack at 40 percent (Lugar, 2005, p. 6). It should be noted, however, that the 
report does not focus on the likelihood of attacks on any specific country.   
Catastrophic risks pose an additional challenge. Because losses can have severe 
financial impacts on insurers and reinsurers who provide coverage in a very competitive 
environment, some of them might decide not to cover a risk unless most of the others do 
so as well. Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden (forthcoming) propose a model that explains 
why insurance providers, acting in a non-coordinated fashion, may choose not to offer 
insurance for catastrophic risks and not to participate in reinsurance markets, even though 
there is sufficient market capacity to reach full risk-sharing. In particular, they show that 
nondiversification traps may arise when risk distributions have fat left tails, implying a   
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relatively high probability of catastrophic losses
4.  There may be a need for some type of 
coordinative mechanism through a centralized agency (e.g. federal government or trade 
associations) to ensure that risk sharing takes place.  
 
Interdependent Security 
The vulnerability of one organization, critical economic sector and/or nation often 
depends not only on its own choice of security investments, but also on the actions of 
other agents. This concept of interdependent security implies that failures of a weak link 
in a connected system could have devastating impacts on all parts of it, and that as a 
result there may be suboptimal investment in the individual components (Kunreuther and 
Heal, 2003; Heal and Kunreuther, 2006). Unless there is a monopolistic insurer who then 
has the ability to internalize these externalities within its entire portfolio, the existence of 
such interdependencies poses another challenge in determining how much terrorism 
insurance to offer and what premium to charge.   
Interdependencies do not require proximity. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, 
security failures at Boston's Logan airport led to crashes at the World Trade Center 
(WTC). The failure was embedded within the security protocols promulgated by the 
Federal Aviation Administration and not with the application of those protocols, i.e., 
checking for bombs in passengers’ luggage, but not profiling. There was nothing that the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and firms located in the WTC could have 
done on their own to prevent these aircrafts from crashing into the Twin Towers. Any 
protective efforts they might have undertaken would have been rendered useless by the 
absence of action at a distant site.   
Except for very specific coverage (e.g., contingent business income), terrorism 
insurance normally does not cover losses unless the insured is the direct target of an 
attack. For example, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) banned takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination. In 
March 2004, the city of Chicago was denied insurance compensation for business 
interruption losses that resulted from the FAA’s decision. The specific clause of the 
insurance contract for business interruption specified that it would cover only losses that 
were the “direct result of a peril not excluded,” thus imposing a limitation that excludes 
interdependent effects due to the response to an attack (U.S. District Court, 2004). 
 
Shifting Attention to Unprotected Targets 
Terrorists may respond to security measures by shifting their attention to more 
vulnerable targets. Sandler (2003), Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003), Lakdawalla and 
Zanjani (2005), and Bier (2007) analyze the relationships between the actions of potential 
victims and the behavior of terrorists. Rather than investing in additional security 
measures, firms may prefer to move their operations from large cities to less populated 
                                                 
4  An insurance portfolio holding equal shares of two risks with fat-tailed distributions might actually be 
more exposed than if that portfolio contains only one of these two risks. Each catastrophe could be so large 
that it affects the insurer’s or reinsurer’s solvency. In this case, catastrophic risk management will differ 
from traditional portfolio optimization which generally benefits from diversification (Samuelson, 1967).    
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areas to reduce the likelihood of an attack
5. Of course, terrorists may choose these less 
protected regions as targets if there is heightened security in the urban areas. Terrorists 
also may change the nature of their attacks if there are protective measures in place which 
would make the likelihood of success of the original option much lower than another 
course of action (e.g. switching from hijacking to bombing a plane). This substitution 
effect has to be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of specific policies aimed  
at curbing terrorism (Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley, 1983). The likelihood and 
consequences of a terrorist attack are thus determined by a mix of strategies and 
counterstrategies developed by a range of stakeholders that change over time. This 
dynamic uncertainty makes the likelihood of future terrorist events extremely difficult to 
predict (Michel-Kerjan, 2003-b). 
 
A factor associated with dynamic uncertainty is the timing of an attack. Given the 
eight years that separated the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the large-
scale terrorist attacks during the morning of September 11, 2001, one could conclude that 
terrorist groups plan their attacks far in advance and perpetrate them when the public’s 
attention and concern with terrorism have receded. This implies that the probability of a 
very large attack is not necessarily lower than that of smaller ones. Indeed, if terrorists 
really want to inflict mass casualty and major economic disruption, as several terrorist 
groups have publicly announced (Central Intelligence Agency, 2003; 9/11 National 
Commission, 2004), the probability distribution of future attacks could be such that there 
is an important mass concentrated on the “no attack” and on the “large attack” states of 
the world, and very little in the middle. In other words, there is a high probability that 
nothing happens, but if an attack is successful, the losses are likely to be catastrophic.     
 
 
Distribution of Information 
The sharing of information on terrorism is clearly different than the sharing of 
information regarding other potentially catastrophic events. For example, there are large 
historical databases and scientific studies in the public domain for natural hazards: 
insurers, property owners, businesses and public sector agencies all have access to this 
information. Data on terrorist groups’ activities and current threats are normally kept 
secret by federal agencies for national security purposes. For example, the public still has 
no idea who manufactured and disseminated anthrax in U.S. mailings during the fall of 
2001. Without this information, it is difficult for modelers to make projections about the 
capability and opportunities of terrorists to undertake similar attacks or other disruptive 
actions in the future. In the context of terrorism, the distribution of information between 
insurees and insurers may be identical in that there is a symmetry of non-information. If 
there is any asymmetry of information, it is in favor of government agencies, which 
affects the optimal risk-sharing arrangements between public and private sectors (Michel-
Kerjan and DeMarcellis, 2006).  
 
                                                 
5 Abadie and Dermisi (2007) show that central business districts can be greatly affected by changes in the 
perceived level of terrorism. Following the 9/11 attacks, there was a pronounced increase in vacancy rates 
in iconic buildings in Chicago such as the Sears Tower, the Aon Center and the Hancock Center.   
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Role of Capital Costs
6 
All these elements force insurers to hold a large amount of capital in order to 
cover potential catastrophic losses from terrorism. An insurer thus needs to charge high 
premiums relative to its loss expenses to earn a fair rate of return on equity and thereby 
maintain its credit rating. To illustrate, we construct a somewhat conservative 
hypothetical example that ignores taxes and regulatory constraints. Consider a portfolio 
that has $1,000 in expected losses, E(L). Let k be the ratio of capital to expected losses 
for the insurer to maintain its credit rating. For this example k=1, a value utilized by 
many property liability insurers for their combined book of business. (Doherty 2000).  
In addition to paying claims, the insurer is assumed to set aside capital for 
covering additional expenses (X) in the form of commissions to agents and brokers and 
underwriting and claims assessment expenses. For this example X = $200.  Given the risk 
characteristics of the portfolio, investors require a return on equity (ROE) of 15 percent to 
compensate for risk. The insurer invests its funds in lower-risk vehicles that yield an 
expected return, r, of 5 percent. What premium π  would the insurer have to charge its 
policyholders to cover them against terrorism and to secure a return of 15 percent for its 
investors? The formula is given by:   
) ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) (
r ROE k r
r X L E
− − +
+ +
= π  
 
which yields a value of  π = $1274 for this hypothetical example.
7  
This calculation is sensitive to the value of k.  For terrorism risk, the volatility of 
E(L) is high since it is extremely difficult to estimate the probability of a future attack.  
As a result, k is likely to be considerably greater than 1, thus significantly increasing the 
premium required to generate a fair return on equity. A related issue with respect to 
terrorism risk is that it can be expensive to underwrite since it requires extensive 
modeling. Many companies buy commercial models and/or use their own in-house 
modeling capability. Moreover, since there is a high likelihood that many insurers might 
experience severe losses at the same time, the demand for capital following a terrorist 
attack is likely to be quite high, increasing its cost. Insurers want to reflect this cost in the 
premiums they charge.  
If we redo the above premium calculation with X= $600 and k= 5, the required 
premium is now $2,964, more than twice the value of π computed above. There are other 
considerations that can increase the cost of capital even further, notably the impact of 
double taxation. Harrington and Niehaus (2001) have shown that tax costs alone can 
exceed the claim costs, which will lead to further increases in premiums.  
                                                 
6 This subsection is based on a recent report on disaster insurance (Wharton Risk Center, 2007). Neil 
Doherty provided the insights on capital costs on which this example is based.  Froot (2007) develops a 
model of optimal pricing and allocation of risks that also addresses these issues. He applies the model to 
underwriting the risk and determining the optimal amount of surplus capital held by the firm.  
7 Specifically  π= [$1,000+ $200(1+.05) ]/ [(1+.05) - 1 (.15-.05)]   
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Government Influencing the Risk  
Another factor that distinguishes terrorism from other risks is who can influence 
the likelihood of specific events and their consequences. International terrorism has always 
been viewed as a matter of national security as well as foreign policy. The government can 
reduce the probability of a successful attack and the resulting outcome through appropriate 
counter-terrorism policies and international cooperation as well as through adequate crisis 
management programs. But some decisions made by a government as part of its foreign 
policy can also affect the will of terrorist groups to attack this country or its interests 
abroad (Lapan and Sandler, 1988; Lee, 1988; Pillar, 2001). Government failure to 
adequately address a large-scale crisis, such as one that would emerge in the aftermath of a 
large terrorist attack, would have a direct impact on many individuals, commercial 
enterprises and their insurers. In that sense, the terrorism risk is a public-private good. 
 
4. Applying the Principles to Federal and Private Terrorism Insurance 
 
These special features of the terrorism risk have important implications for 
designing a risk-sharing arrangement that meets the five principles specified in Section 2.  
Here we examine how well two specific programs fare on these grounds. We start with 
the federal government establishing its own insurance program without any private 
insurer and reinsurer involvement. We then turn to the establishment of a private sector 
terrorism insurance market with no government intervention. We also discuss the pros 
and cons and feasibility of these arrangements.  
 
Federal Insurance Program 
A federal terrorism insurance program has, in fact, been established in the U.S. to 
cover third party liability facing airlines (i.e., harm to passengers and crew along with 
individuals or property on the ground). Seven days after the 9/11 attacks, commercial 
aviation insurance providers cancelled all third party liability insurance policies 
worldwide, which created a crisis, because according to international law, an aircraft 
cannot take off without such liability coverage. A few days later, insurers reinstated the 
insurance for passengers but imposed minimal coverage for losses to people and property 
on the ground. For example, the new typical policies offered to the airlines included        
a $50 million maximum limit for third parties compared to pre-9/11 caps in the $1.5 to  
$2 billion range. 
 
In most countries, the government stepped in to fill the gap and installed a 
government program so the commercial aviation could continue to operate. In the United 
States, the Air Transportation and System Stabilization Act was passed by Congress on 
September 22, 2001 and extended the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)’s ability to 
provide that type of insurance coverage to all U.S. commercial air carriers. This 
emergency measure was designated as temporary, but the program has been reauthorized 
several times since its inception and remains in effect today. As of October 1, 2006, 
policies under this program provide 75 airlines with insurance coverage for potential   
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losses ranging from $100 million to $4 billion each (White House, 2007). This program 
presents an ideal case for studying how a federal insurance meets our principles. 
  
Risk-based Premiums    Under this program, airlines pay a premium per flight to the 
Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund managed by the FAA, based on their performance 
activity (the number of emplacements and revenue passenger per mile or revenue ton 
miles for freight operation). In this sense, the premium reflects relative risk exposure: the 
more your aircraft flies in a given year, the higher your risk is and the more you pay for 
coverage.  
But the premium levels charged against airlines remains extremely low by all 
accounts. In 2003 the FAA reported that its exposure under the program was $113 billion 
(U.S. GAO, 2003a). Using the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ reported flight 
operations data for 2003, and FAA projections of flight operations growth
8, it would take 
from 2001 to 2016 for the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund to accumulate $1 billion in 
collected premiums assuming a constant interest rate of 7 percent on invested capital and 
air traffic operations growth of 3.5 percent if there were no claims during this 15 year 
period (Straus, 2005). 
 
Sufficient Demand for Coverage   All airlines are required to hold third party liability 
insurance, so they all participate in this subsidized program.   
 
Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency  Since insurers are not involved in this program and 
airlines’ liability is limited to $100 million above the losses which will be paid by the 
government, this program addresses the insolvency issue. The capacity of the government 
to diversify losses by assessing taxpayers over time gives the public sector an advantage 
over any private insurer (Gollier, 2001). Furthermore the government does not need to 
hold excess capital to meet losses should they be catastrophic. 
 
Equitability  An important issue with any government program is that it imposes risk on 
stakeholders other than those it covers. Given the 15 years or so required for this program 
to build up $1 billion in reserves, the government is likely to finance a major loss from a 
terrorist attack in the near future with taxpayers’ money.  
 
Minimize Gaming  Since all airlines are required to purchase this coverage at prices 
that are fixed, it is difficult to see how any airline could game the system.  
 
Private Market Solution  
The other option would be to let the market operate for terrorism risk without any 
government intervention.  
Risk-based Premiums  Insurers would decide whether to provide terrorism coverage 
and if so, what price to charge given their own evaluation of the risk. In that sense, a 
laissez-faire approach satisfies this principle. 
                                                 
8 2003 Aviation Capacity Enhancement Plan, Federal Aviation Administration, 
http://www.faa.gov/ats/asc/03ACE.html.   
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Sufficient Demand for Coverage  Given their need to hold significant amounts of 
capital to cover the potential catastrophic losses from a terrorism attack, insurers would 
charge very high premiums for limited coverage as illustrated by the case of insuring 
Chicago’s O’Hare Airport. Prior to 9/11 the airport had $750 million of terrorism 
insurance coverage at an annual premium of $125,000. After the terrorist attacks, insurers 
offered the airport only $150 million of coverage at an annual premium of $6.9 million 
(representing an increase in the premium over coverage ratio of over 275 percent!). The 
airport was forced to purchase this policy since it could not operate without coverage 
(Jaffee and Russell, 2003). Another example is the Golden Gate Park in San Francisco, 
which was simply unable to obtain terrorism coverage at any price (Smetters, 2004). 
Furthermore, rating agencies’ criteria for sound management would lead insurers 
to limit the concentration of their exposure. Insurers could attempt to transfer portions of 
their risk to reinsurers, but the amount of available coverage for the U.S. market in 2005 
was only in the range of $6-8 billion, (Wharton Risk Center, 2005). Moreover, the cost of 
capital for reinsurers is also high because of their concern with a catastrophic loss.   
  In theory, insurers could also transfer part of their terrorism risk to the capital 
markets through new financial instruments that have been developed over the past decade 
(e.g., industry loss warranties, catastrophe bonds, or, more recently, sidecars). Since 9/11, 
however, only three terrorism-related catastrophe bonds have been issued and these were 
part of multi-event coverage for other risks such as natural disasters and pandemics 
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2005; U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 2005). Most 
investors and rating agencies consider terrorism models as too new and untested to be 
used in conjunction with a catastrophe bond covering terrorism risks. The models are 
viewed as providing useful information on the potential severity of the attacks but not on 
their frequency. Without the acceptance of these models by major rating agencies, the 
development of a large market for terrorism catastrophe bonds is unlikely (U.S. GAO, 
2003b).  
   These features of terrorism suggest that there will be limited demand by firms for 
partial coverage, given the very high prices that would be charged by insurers for 
protecting firms against this risk. As memories of 9/11 fade, many firms are likely to 
conclude that such insurance is too costly and not necessary. The risk of future losses will 
be viewed as below their threshold level of concern, thus contributing to a low level of 
insurance coverage. 
 
Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency  In his study on insurers’ decision rules, Stone 
(1973) develops a model whereby firms maximize expected profits subject to satisfying a 
constraint related to the survival of the firm.
9 An insurer satisfies its survival constraint 
by choosing a portfolio of risks with an overall expected probability of total claims 
payments greater than some predetermined amount (L*) that is less than some threshold 
probability, p1.  This threshold probability reflects the trade-off between the expected 
benefits of issuing another insurance policy and the costs to the firm of a catastrophic loss 
that reduces the insurer’s surplus by L* or more. The value of L* is determined by an 
                                                 
9 Stone also introduces a constraint regarding the stability of the insurer’s operation. However, insurers 
have traditionally not focused on this constraint in dealing with catastrophic risks.    
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insurer’s concern with insolvency and/or a sufficiently large loss in surplus that will lead 
a rating agency to downgrade its credit rating. If insurers are free to charge whatever 
prices they think are appropriate and are not required to cover any specific risk, they are 
likely to use a survival constraint to determine their portfolio of policies for covering the 
terrorism risk.  
 
Equitability  In a free market, only those who perceive themselves to be at risk pay for 
terrorism coverage. In this sense, a private insurance program appears to be equitable. 
But there are also issues related to ex post payments to disaster victims that need to be 
considered. As noted above, given the high prices charged by insurers to reflect to cost of 
capital necessary to cover that risk, only a small portion of the firms are likely to be 
insured. After the next terrorist attack, the government, using general taxpayers’ revenue, 
is likely to compensate the uninsured victims for damage they sustained. This behavior 
would be viewed as inequitable if one feels that uninsured firms should bear their own 
costs following a disaster.  
 
Minimize Gaming  If firms believe that the federal government will assist them 
following a terrorist attack, they may behave strategically by not purchasing insurance 
and expect to be rescued by federal relief.  There is considerable empirical evidence from 
public sector actions following natural disasters that the government will respond with 
liberal relief to victims following a catastrophic loss (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2006). 
 
Challenges in Implementing These Programs for Commercial Risks  
Federal Terrorism Insurance      While a federal insurance program for third party liability 
facing airlines satisfies most of the principles, it illustrates the challenges of balancing 
effective and affordable coverage with equity issues. Moreover, the program cannot be 
easily extended from 75 airlines to the 31 million commercial enterprises in the United 
States. Such an enterprise is likely to strain the capacity of the government to assess the 
risk, market coverage and to deal with the claims process after the next mega attack. Any 
federal program without the collaboration of the insurance industry excludes the insurers’ 
expertise as well as its financial and operational capacity to provide coverage nationwide.  
 
Private Sector Approach  As pointed out in the Introduction, there was limited 
interest by private insurers in voluntarily providing terrorism coverage following 9/11. 
Reinsurers were reluctant to provide coverage and a market for terrorism coverage 
through insurance-linked securities did not emerge. We also noted that the federal 
government is likely to come to the rescue of uninsured victims after the next large-scale 
terrorist attack.  
In our description of a free terrorism insurance market, we assumed that insurers 
were free to decide what risks to cover, and what price to charge. Such a laissez faire 
market for terrorism risk coverage would require a radical change in the current state 
regulatory system in place in the United States since many insurers are constrained in 
rates they can charge.
10 They are also required to include any losses from terrorism in 
                                                 
10 For instance, at the end of 2002, the Insurance Services Office (ISO) used the estimates provided by AIR 
Worldwide (one of its subsidiaries) to file advisory loss costs with the insurance commissioner for each 
state. ISO defined three tiers for the country,  placing  certain  areas  within  Chicago,  New  York  City,           
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workers’ compensation policies (in every state except Texas) as well as losses from fire 
following a terrorist attack in approximately one third of all states. The specific features 
of the terrorism risk and the challenges associated with having either federal insurance or 
a free market solution led to a call for some type of collaboration between the private and 
public sectors
11. In the United States, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
of 2002 (TRIA) to deal with this issue. When TRIA was renewed at the end of 2005, the 
Act maintained a similar risk-sharing arrangement for 2006-2007 with an increase in the 
share of the losses covered by the private sector.  
The remainder of this paper evaluates TRIA over the period 2002-2007 using the 
five principles. As this paper is being completed, proposed legislation for extending 
TRIA is being considered by Congress. One new feature of the legislation that will be 
discussed in the next section is that TRIA would be extended for fifteen years, thus 
creating a situation where some insurers would have an economic incentive to game the 
system.  
 
5. Terrorism Risk Sharing under TRIA 
 
Eligibility for Coverage 
Under the TRIA program, insurers are obligated to offer terrorism coverage to all 
their commercially insured clients. Firms are not required to purchase this insurance 
unless mandated by state law, as is the case for workers’ compensation lines. The stated 
coverage limits and deductibles must be the same as for losses from other events covered 
by the firm’s current policy. This implies that if there are restrictions on a standard 
commercial insurance policy, then terrorism coverage will also exclude losses from these 
events. Thus the risks related to a terrorist attack using nuclear, biological, chemical, or 
radiological weapons (NBCR) are covered under TRIA only if the primary policy 
includes such coverage.  
 
Structure of the Partnership 
Under TRIA there is a specific risk-sharing arrangement between the federal 
government and insurers for a certified event. Figure 1 depicts the public-private loss-
sharing for an insurer when total insured losses are less than $100 billion. If the loss 
suffered by an insurance company i is less than its deductible (IDi), the insurer does not 
receive any reimbursement from the federal government. This situation is illustrated by 
an insured loss of L1 in Figure 1 where the insurer’s payment is represented by the 
oblique lines. If the insured loss due to a certified terrorist attack is greater than its 
deductible, as depicted by L2 in Figure 1, the federal government will initially reimburse 
the insurer for a portion α of the losses above its deductible. From 2002 to 2006, α was  
90 percent and it was reduced to 85 percent in 2007. During the 2002 to 2006 period, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
San Francisco and Washington, DC, in the highest tier, with assigned loss costs of approximately $0.10 per 
$100 of property value. But ISO’s advisory loss costs were challenged by some regulators who felt that 
such premiums would lead businesses to relocate to other areas. Negotiations ensued and compromises 
were made, and nowhere did the filed loss costs exceed $0.03 per $100 of property value in the first tier. 
11 See U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2007-a) for a discussion of alternative policy options to TRIA.    
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insurer was responsible for paying only 10 percent of the losses up front (this figure was 
increased to 15 percent in 2007). The federal payment is represented by horizontal lines 
in the figure. This federal backstop provision is equivalent to free up-front reinsurance 
above the deductible. As will be discussed later, the federal government will recoup part 
or all of this payment from all commercial policyholders.   
          The  insurer’s  deductible  is  determined as a percentage of its total direct 
commercial property and casualty earned premiums of the preceding year for TRIA lines 
(that is, lines covered by the Act), and not just the premiums of clients that purchase 
terrorism coverage. This deductible has significantly increased over time: 7 percent in 
2002 and 2003, 10 percent in 2004, 15 percent in 2005, 17.5 percent in 2006, and 20 
percent in 2007. That means that if an attack occurs in 2007, insurers will be responsible 
for losses equal to 20 percent of the direct commercial property and casualty earned 
premiums in 2006. This deductible plays a very important role in determining loss 
sharing between insurers and the federal government, and can be very large for many 
insurers.
12  





























































[Note: If the insurance company’s (i) loss is less than its deductible (IDi), the insurer is not reimbursed          
by the government (e.g., for an insured loss of L1). If the loss is greater than the deductible (L2), the 
government reimburses the insurer for α percent of the losses above its deductible, and the insurer pays        
(1- α )] 
 
                                                 
12 Using data provided by A.M. Best on their estimates of TRIA retentions for major publicly held 
insurance companies for 2005, we determined this deductible to be $3.6 billion for American International 
Group (AIG) and $2.5 billion for St. Paul Travelers. Four other companies on the list of top 10 insurers, 
based on TRIA-line direct-earned premiums had TRIA deductibles between $800 million and $2.1 billion 
in 2005.     
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If the insurance industry suffers terrorism losses that require the government to 
cover a portion of companies’ claims, then these outlays will be fully or partially 
recouped ex post. More specifically, the federal government will recoup the portion of its 
payment between the total insurers’ outlays and an insurance industry aggregate retention 
amount; called the “mandatory recoupment.” The industry aggregate retention, which is 
defined by law, has been increased over time to transfer more of terrorism risk to the 
private sector: it was $15 billion in 2005; $25 billion in 2006; $27.5 billion in 2007. 
 
This mandatory recoupment
13 is obtained by levying a surcharge on all 
commercially insured policyholders, whether they had purchased terrorism insurance or 
not. If the insured losses exceed $100 billion during the year, then the U.S. Treasury will 
determine how the losses above this amount will be covered
14.  
 
This federal recoupment surcharge “may not exceed, on an annual basis, the 
amount equal to 3 percent of the premium charged for property and casualty insurance 
coverage under the policy.”
15 Insurers play the role of intermediaries by levying this 
surcharge against all their property and casualty policyholders
16, whether or not they had 
purchased terrorism insurance, and transfer the collected funds to the Department of 
Treasury. In other words, taxpayers would have paid insured losses between $15 and 
$100 billion if a large attack had occurred in 2005; they would pay insured losses 
between $27.5 and $100 billion if a large attack occurred in 2007. 
  
The law indicates that the federal government could also recoup part of that 
payment (so-called “discretionary recoupment”) but is not clear on the process; in this 
paper we assume that this does not exist. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the repayment schedule, under TRIA, between the insurers, all 
commercial policyholders and the taxpayers after the federal government has reimbursed 
all insurers for 90 percent (85 percent in 2007) of their claims payments above their 




                                                 
13 The law is ambiguous as to what will happen if the total insurers’ outlays are above this market aggregate 
retention.   
 
14 The TRIA legislation states that “If the aggregate insured losses exceed $100,000,000,000, (i) the 
Secretary shall not make any payment under this title for any portion of the amount of such losses that 
exceeds $100,000,000,000; and (ii) no insurer that has met its insurer deductible shall be liable for the 
payment of any portion of that amount that exceeds $100,000,000,000. Congress shall determine the 
procedures for and the source of any payments for such excess insured losses.” §103(e)(2)(A).  The 2005 
extension of TRIA does not modify this. 
 
15 TRIA, Section 103(e)(8)(C).   
 
16 There is no statement in the legislation or its interpretation that specifically indicates that only the 
commercial policyholders are taxed.  We have discussed this point with insurers and reinsurers. They have 
assumed that because TRIA applies only to commercial enterprises, the Department of Treasury will tax 
only commercial entities after a terrorist attack.   
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6. Applying the Five Principles to TRIA 
  We now examine how well the principles developed in Section 2 apply to TRIA 
by focusing on data we collected for the period 2002-2006. For two of the principles, 
Equitability  and  Minimize Gaming, we consider the impact of the proposed 2007 
legislation on insurers’ behavior and its possible consequences on the market.  
Risk-based Premiums  
It should be clear from the discussion in the previous sections, however, that there 
are limited data for estimating the likelihood of a terrorist attack and its resulting 
consequences, so it is difficult to know whether premiums are risk-based. Experts utilize 
a scenario-based approach to estimate direct consequences (e.g,. physical damage, lives 
lost) as well as indirect impacts (e.g., losses due to business interruption) from a range of 
terrorism-related events that vary by location and mode of attack
17.    However, few 
insurers consider the likelihood of these scenarios occurring in determining their 
exposure
18. 
                                                 
17 When asked, “Does your company consider scenarios in its catastrophe/exposure management process?” 
92 percent of the insurers who responded to the Wharton questionnaire answered “Yes.” One company 
responded to the above question by noting: “Our company uses deterministic terrorist attack scenarios, 
and the associated Probable Maximum Loss (PML) estimates of these scenarios, to establish and manage 
exposure concentrations within major metropolitan areas and/or surrounding landmark properties.” 
(Wharton Risk Center, 2005). 
 
18 This is illustrated by the following responses by insurers to the question: “Do you take estimates of the 
likelihood of the various known scenarios into account when making underwriting decisions?”: “Not 
really.  There is little historical data to predict future events;” “Likelihood is very unpredictable for 
terrorist acts.” “Our company does not believe that estimates of the frequency of terrorist attacks are 
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TRIA’s most important success was to significantly reduce and stabilize the price 
of terrorism insurance compared to premiums charged between 9/11 and the enactment of 
this legislation. Surveys undertaken on a regular basis since the inception of TRIA by 
Marsh and Aon, the two largest insurance brokers operating in the U.S., provide a good 
representation of the market for medium and large accounts. A recent Marsh survey of 
over 1,600 client firms in the U.S. that covers the past 11 quarters revealed that the cost 
of property terrorism insurance decreased significantly in 2005. The median terrorism 
price, which is calculated as the ratio of premium to total insured value (and is the figure 
used by most of the surveys of the U.S. market), fell from $57 per million dollars of total 
insured value in 2004 to $42 in 2005, a decline in the average cost of terrorism coverage 
by over 25 percent (Marsh, 2006). These rates increased in 2006 in most regions except 
for the Midwest where prices remained stable and were much lower than the three other 
regions, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  Terrorism Pricing (Premiums per $ million of Total Insured Value) 
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  Source: Authors’ calculations with data from Marsh. 
 
International comparisons are also helpful, even though they should be taken with 
caution since programs and type of coverage differ from one country to another. Recent 
results are somewhat puzzling, though. For instance, Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2007) 
analyze terrorism insurance costs for a total of 2,600 large companies in the U.S. and 
Germany that decided to purchase that coverage in 2006, and conclude that terrorism 
insurance prices (defined as premiums over quantity of insurance purchased) in Germany 
are on average 2 to 4 times higher than in the U.S.  
Even though it may be difficult to achieve risk-based premiums for terrorism, 
state insurance regulators should not restrict rates unduly to the extent that insurers will 
not want to provide coverage. Currently, some states limit the premiums that insurers can 
charge for terrorism coverage. These restrictions may lead insurers not to offer property 
insurance to certain firms if they feel that such coverage will be unprofitable in the long-
run. 
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Sufficient Demand for Coverage  
 
The requirement under TRIA that insurers offer terrorism coverage, coupled with 
the relatively low premiums, has significantly contributed to increase take-up rate. Data 
provided by Marsh that we summarize in Figure 4 show a significant and fairly 
continuous increase of the take-up rate, from 23 percent in the second quarter of 2003 to 
62 percent in the fourth quarter of 2006. These data suggest that most of the surveyed 
companies that wanted such coverage have now purchased it. The remaining companies 
are self-insured, except for terrorist losses that would be covered by workers’ 
compensation or by fire due to terrorism.  
 
Many of the large companies surveyed by Marsh may self-insure through the use 
of structured debt (e.g., warrants, convertible and forgivable debt) and contingent capital 
(i.e., financing that is contingent on the occurrence of specified events) (Doherty, 2000). 
Another reason why some firms might not consider insurance to be a good risk financing 
alternative in the case of terrorism is that the default risk might seem too high to make 
insurance a viable option to protect their assets
19.   
 






























Minimize Likelihood of Insolvency 
Due to the uncertainty in the likelihood of terrorism losses, insurers use a survival 
constraint to determine the extent of coverage that they are willing to offer. The essence 
of the survival constraint is to write coverage so that an insurer’s aggregate exposure (E) 
                                                 
19 The presence of default risk has received little attention in the theoretical literature on insurance even 
though that risk exists in many insurance situations. Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) and Mahul and Wright 
(2004) examine the effect of risk of default on rational insurance purchases. The first study concludes that 
because of default risk less-than-full insurance coverage optimal, even if the contract is sold at an 
actuarially fair price. The second study concludes that the optimal insurance contract under rational 
expectations is a disappearing deductible under full performance (no default) and coinsurance above a 
deductible under partial default. These results differ from Arrow (1971) which establishes that for a 
premium depending only on the policy’s actuarial value, a risk-averse firm would prefer full (marginal) 
insurance coverage above a deductible, and that the optimal deductible is zero. 
Source: Authors’ calculation with data from Marsh (Based on a sample of 1,600 large companies).   
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under an assumed scenario will not exceed a certain percentage of its policyholders’ 
surplus (S).  Although the insurers’ exact terrorism exposure is not publicly available, we 
can assume that insurers with large deductibles (D) relative to their surplus (S) are the 
ones most at risk if they are providing terrorism coverage to most of their policyholders. 
Using a data set provided to us by A.M. Best for the top 470 insurers in the U.S. (ranked 
by the volume of TRIA-line insurance sold), we determined the evolution of the D/S ratio 
for our sample of 451 insurers for 2003-2005.  
294 insurance companies providing terrorism insurance in the U.S. had a D/S ratio 
lower than 10 percent in 2003 compared with only 139 insurers in 2005. Only 36 insurers 
in the sample had a D/S ratio above 20 percent in 2003, while there were 80 such insurers 
in 2004 and 162 in 2005 (including 8 of the 30 largest insurers) as depicted in Figure 5. 
Rating agencies are likely to view such high ratios with some concern.  
Figure 5.  451 Largest Insurers’ Exposure to Terrorism under TRIA (2003-2005):  
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[Note: The analysis is conducted for the Top 451 insurers in the U.S. Each year, we plot the number 
of insurers whose D/S ratio lies between different percentage ranges in increments of 5 percent (e.g., 
[0% and 4.99%]; [5% and 9.99%], etc.).] 
 
We also computed the D/S ratios for 2006 and 2007 for the top 30 insurers using 
extrapolated figures from 2003-2005. Figure 6 depicts the number of insurers (y-axis) 
whose D/S exceeds pre-specified values of x percent (x-axis) from 2003-2007. We see 
that 13 of the top 30 insurers would have a TRIA-deductible higher than 20 percent        
of their surplus in 2007. While none of these 30 insurers had a D/S ratio higher than      
50 percent in 2005, three insurers had D/S ratios above this percentage in 2006 and 2007.   
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In states such as California and New York, where only a few companies insure 
the largest portion of the workers’ compensation market, these insurers are likely to bear 
the largest portion of the losses from a large-scale terrorist attack that inflicts mass 
casualties. For instance, in California, the State Compensation Insurance Fund represents 
half of the workers’ compensation market in the state. Under TRIA today, 85 percent of 
the losses above their deductibles would initially be covered by the federal government 
and eventually be paid by all policyholders and taxpayers. Since workers’ compensation 
providers are not able to exclude terrorism from their policies, in the absence of federal 
backstop some of these insurers are likely to become insolvent after a large terrorist 
attack unless they were to be able to obtain protection against catastrophic losses from the 
private sector and/or reduce their exposure to such losses by downsizing their portfolios.  
 
Figure 6.  Number of the Top 30 Insurers Whose D/S Exceeds Pre-specified Values  
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Equitability  
Under TRIA, an “act of terrorism” is defined as one “committed by an individual 
or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an 
effort to coerce the civilian population of the U.S. or to influence the policy or to affect 
the conduct of the U.S. Government by coercion,” and one in which aggregate insured 
losses are at least $100 million.  The proposed legislation to extend TRIA removes the 
“foreign person or interest” restriction and reduces the total insured loss trigger to $50 
million.  
An attack like the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995 that killed 168 people and 
was the most damaging attack on domestic soil prior to 9/11, would not be a certified 
event under TRIA because it would be considered domestic terrorism. It makes good 
sense to include all “acts of terrorism” as certified events. In fact, the distinction between 
what would be a “certified” event and a so-called “domestic” terrorist event may be 
difficult to establish. For example, are attacks on the U.S. soil similar to the ones 
perpetrated in London on July 7, 2005 considered domestic or international?  We know 
today that some of the terrorists were British citizens who were trained to kill in Pakistan.    
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By providing financial protection to those who suffer losses from any terrorist attack, 
whether by a foreigner or someone from this country, the insurance program is more 
equitable. 
The rationale for a decrease in the loss trigger is that small insurers could suffer 
severe losses from a terrorist attack, losses that might severely deplete their surpluses or 
that might lead to insolvency if the current $100 million trigger level were maintained.  
This proposed reduction to $50 million in total insured losses would thus satisfy the 
principle of equitability by helping small firms to stay in business, assuming that they 
would have difficulty obtaining affordable reinsurance premiums to protect themselves 
from losses between $50 million and $100 million.  
A third area of equitability relates to who should pay for the losses following a 
terrorist attack. TRIA holds that if the insurance industry suffers terrorism losses that 
require the government to cover a portion of their claims, then these outlays shall be fully 
or partially recouped ex post by levying a surcharge on all commercially insured 
policyholders, not just the policyholders who had purchased terrorism coverage. This 
implies that if losses are sufficiently high, the responsibility for recouping these payments 
rests with all firms who have purchased insurance in any of the TRIA-covered lines. 
  Using data collected on the top 451 insurers operating in the United States which 
comprise 97 percent of the market with respect to 2004 TRIA-line direct earned 
premiums (DEP)
20, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2006) examined the impact of the 
2006 TRIA design on loss-sharing between the key stakeholders: victims, insurers and 
their policyholders, and the taxpayers.  By simulating the explosion of a 5-ton truck bomb 
in one of the 447 tallest high-rises in major cities in the United States (see Appendix 2), 
we conclude that under the current program, taxpayers are not likely to pay anything for 
losses below $25 billion. For a $40 billion loss, insurers and policyholders would handle 
between 75 percent and 95 percent of the loss depending on the proportion of 
policyholders who purchased some type of terrorism insurance (i.e., the property take-up 
rate). In one $40 billion loss scenario, all commercial policyholders would end up paying 
$6.3 billion as the result of the mandatory recoupment, whether or not they had purchased 
terrorism insurance. More generally, what is clear is that insurers and all commercial 
policyholders will pay a much greater loss share in 2006 and 2007 than under the 2005-
attack scenario, due to the higher deductible and higher market retention. Hence, the 
general taxpayer incurs a smaller portion of the loss. 
  While the increase in insurers’ deductible had an important impact on the 
distribution of potential losses and equity issues, the major change when TRIA was 
renewed at the end of 2005 was certainly the increase of insurance industry retention 
from $15 to $25 billion in 2006. Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2006) show that this 
change will shift a significant portion of the losses that would have been paid by 
taxpayers to all commercial policyholders for terrorist attack scenarios where losses are 
$25 billion and $40 billion.
21  
                                                 
20 Since data are not available on individual insurers’ terrorism exposure, market share appears to be the 
most reasonable proxy for analyzing loss sharing across the affected parties. 
21 For a terrorist attack scenario where the loss is $100 billion there is no difference between the two 
retention limits because our analysis for 2006 reveals that insurers already pay $34.1 billion in claims,   
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Minimize Gaming  
We now turn to our fifth principle and to an aspect of TRIA that has not been 
considered by those who have designed the program. If TRIA is made permanent or 
extended for a long period of time without being reviewed on a regular basis, very large 
insurers with low deductible/surplus ratios could strategize by significantly increasing 
their terrorism underwriting. Any insurer with a low deductible/surplus (D/S) ratio would 
have an economic incentive to write a large number of policies in a concentrated area 
subject to a terrorist attack (e.g. Times Square, Wall Street area) due to the positive 
correlation in these losses. In other words, the insurer knows that if one of these buildings 
is damaged or destroyed, the surrounding ones are also likely to suffer severe damage. 
They would then collect large amounts of premiums for terrorism insurance but would be 
financially responsible for only a small portion of the claims. Commercial policyholders 
(whether or not they are covered against terrorism) and the federal government would 
absorb the residual insured losses. 
Determining Terrorism Coverage Using an “E* Gaming Strategy”  
To examine how the aggregate exposure/surplus ratio affects the amount of coverage an 
insurer will want to provide if TRIA is extended indefinitely, we propose a simple model 
with the following notation: 
 
E* = maximum insured terrorism exposure (i.e. worst case scenario) 
E = actual dollar claims incurred by an insurer from a worst case scenario  
DEP = direct earned premiums written for TRIA lines of coverage 
D = a.DEP = TRIA deductible determined by the percentage a  
       (e.g. a = 20% in 2007) 
S = current surplus 
X = E/S = aggregate exposure for terrorism/surplus ratio   
Y = D/S = deductible/surplus ratio   
 
Given the difficulties in estimating the probability of a terrorist attack, rating 
agencies focus on deterministic scenarios in evaluating an insurer’s credit rating. We 
focus our estimates on insured losses from a five-to-six ton truck bomb scenario in 
determining the maximum exposure an insurer will be willing to accept. If an insurer 
experiences insured losses of E*, it determines its dollar claims (E) using one of two 
equations:  
 
   E  = E*     if  E* ≤ D           (1)  
   E = D  + .15 (E* - D)     if  E* > D      (2)  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
which is above the $25 billion retention. In this case there is no mandatory recoupment by the federal 
government.   
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We define an E* gaming strategy as the decision by an insurer to increase 
significantly the amount of coverage it provides in order to take advantage of the 85 
percent risk-sharing arrangement with the government in 2007, and at the same time to 
collect a significant amount of terrorism insurance premiums. 
For each insurer, we can determine its aggregate terrorism coverage in urban 
areas. We assume that each insurer is concerned with maintaining an aggregate exposure 
from deterministic scenarios at 10 percent of its surplus (S). Insurers with a D/S ratio 
greater than 10 percent will limit their exposure to 10 percent of their surplus (E* = E). 
Those with D/S less than 10 percent could offer much more coverage than under TRIA, 
particularly those with very small D/S due to a large surplus (E* > E).  
Figure 7 depicts the difference that fixing a threshold of E/S = 10 percent would 
have on insurers’ decisions regarding how much terrorism coverage to offer, depending 
on whether the insurer had a D/S ration higher than 10 percent (Insurer (a); left part of the 
graph) and those with D/S less than 10 percent (Insurer (b); right part of the graph).  In 
both cases, there are two bars. The solid gray bar on the left indicates the D/S ratio of the 
insurer in 2005, the one made up of oblique lines on the right indicates exposure based on 
the constraint that E/S = 10 percent.  
 




  The aggregate exposure for each of these two types of insurer is depicted in 
Figure 8. An insurer with considerable business in non-TRIA lines such that its surplus is 
high but its deductible is quite low will take advantage of the structure of TRIA’s 
program (if it is made permanent) by increasing its aggregate exposure considerably from 
the current level, up to E*.  
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Figure 8.  Gaming TRIA. Aggregate Exposure of Insured Losses;  
    Additional Capacity Provided by Insurers with D/S<10% 
  
Using E*, one can then determine how the coverage from a terrorist attack would 
be spread across insurers and compare it with what would have happened under TRIA. 
Because insurers with low D/S ratios are willing to write considerably more property 
coverage at relatively low prices in metropolitan areas if TRIA is extended indefinitely, 
all commercial enterprises will expect to be insured against property losses (we assume a 
100 percent take-up rate)
22.  
In order to measure that behavior empirically, we focus on the locations where a 
large terrorism loss is more likely. To make the data analysis manageable, we have 
limited our sample of insurers to those who already provide the largest terrorism 
coverage in urban areas. We have undertaken the analysis here for the year 2005. We 
selected the top 30 insurers based on TRIA-line direct earned premiums in 2004 and then 
eliminated the 7 companies who are small business and personal lines insurers  This 
group of 23 large insurers actually accounted for about two-thirds of the TRIA-lines 
direct earned premiums in that year
23.  For the sake of simplicity, we then make the 
assumption that these 23 insurers cover 100 percent of the insured losses in the city we 
consider. We then analyze how losses would be shared under TRIA and compare this 
with a design of a “permanent” TRIA. 
Table 1 provides the aggregate results of the analysis comparing loss sharing 
among all commercial policyholders under TRIA and U.S. taxpayers with loss sharing 
                                                 
22 It is unclear how terrorism insurance will be priced under this scenario. Insurers with low D/S ratios 
competing for business in urban areas will have an economic incentive to reduce their price as they expand 
their coverage, because they know they will be only responsible for 10 percent of any loss greater than D – 
something an insurer with a more limited surplus cannot do. As a result, the major providers of coverage 
will be winnowed down to only a few insurers. 
 
23 In 2005, insurers were responsible for only 10 percent of the insured losses above their deductible, not  
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under an E* strategy if an attack in New York City inflicted $25 billion of total losses in 
2005. Because the total loss will increase from $17.5 billion (with a 50 percent take-up 
rate) to $25 billion (with a 100 percent take-up rate), the general taxpayer’s share of the 
loss will increase from $2.5 billion to $10 billion – that is a 300 percent increase from 
what taxpayers would have paid under the TRIA program in 2005.  
The difference between the $15 billion insurance industry retention in 2005 and 
insurers’ payments of $13.3 billion will be charged against all commercial policyholders 
who will experience a 288 percent increase in payments. The difference in market share 
by the insurers playing an E* strategy would result in a 37 percent decrease in insurance 
industry payments, even if all losses caused by the attacks are now covered. The very 
large insurers with low D/S ratios will provide most of the coverage and pay very little 
after a terrorist attack compared with their aggregate exposure. They would keep all their 
premiums and transfer the loss to all commercial policyholders and taxpayers. This points 
to an inequity in this system, because the policyholders of those insurers who do not 
suffer any loss are responsible for the same amount of repayment to the government in 
the form of a surcharge as are policyholders in companies that suffered large losses and 
were subsidized by the government. 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of Losses under TRIA-2005, and if TRIA is Made Permanent  
($25 billion loss in New York City) 
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Insured loss sharing 76%  9.8%  14.2% 















Insured loss sharing 46%  14%  40% 
Change in final payments -37%  +288%  +300% 
 
Minimize Gaming:  There are several reasons why insurers may not be willing to assume 
the large aggregate exposure implied by an E* gaming strategy.  
First, a larger E* increases the likelihood that an insurer will experience medium to large 
losses below its TRIA deductible by insuring more structures in high-risk areas.  In this 
sense, insurers may decide to limit their aggregate exposure by estimating the likelihood 
of different terrorist attack scenarios. Insurers may then reduce their aggregate exposure 
by utilizing their survival constraint in a manner similar to the processes they follow for   
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other catastrophic risks. Second, when an insurer provides coverage against terrorism it 
also provides insurance against all other events that could cause damage or losses to their 
property and/or claims from their workers’ compensation coverage. When an insurer 
decides whether to write more terrorism coverage, it needs to consider its aggregate 
exposure from a much broader set of risks (e.g., fire, theft, work injury).   
Insurers may be also concerned that Congress will amend a long term/permanent 
TRIA-like program if legislators observe the type of strategizing described above.   
Consider, for example, insurers who expanded their coverage by focusing on E* because 
they thought they would benefit from TRIA for the indefinite future. If new legislation 
now makes them responsible for 50 percent of their losses above their TRIA deductible, 
these insurers will very likely want to cancel some of their commercial policies for fear 
of incurring large claim costs after a terrorist attack. One reason why no insurer has 
followed an E* gaming strategy to date is because the initial period of the program (three 
years) and the first renewal period (two years) were not long enough to merit a major 
change in their terrorism risk coverage strategy.  
 
7. Conclusion and Future Research 
Covering commercial enterprises against terrorism risk constitutes a new 
insurance market in the United States. Given that millions of companies are now covered, 
that market has become a more substantive one within just a few years. This paper has 
discussed some key features of terrorism which make the risk difficult to analyze using 
optimal risk sharing models. For this reason, we proposed five principles to guide the 
evaluation of programs designed to provide financial protection to potential victims of 
major disasters. We applied these principles to the case of mega-terrorism but they should 
have broad applicability in the field of catastrophe risk management.  
  The series of disasters that occurred at an accelerated rate in the last few years 
demonstrate that we have entered a new era of large-scale risks and mega-catastrophes. 
Consider the 20 most costly insured catastrophes in the world between 1970 and 2006. 
Half of them occurred since 2001, nine in the United States.
24 These data suggest that 
catastrophes should no longer be considered low-probability events. Given the increase in 
globalization of economic and social activities worldwide, future catastrophes will have 
both devastating impacts on victims who directly suffer from them and indirectly affect 
many others located hundreds if not thousands of miles away. This raises important 
questions such as the implication of fat tails on risk diversification, optimal risk sharing 
and price arrangements when the risk is highly uncertain, and the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of the public and private sectors. Future research is also needed to provide 
better understanding of the pricing and availability of terrorism insurance coverage under 
TRIA and how this impacts on demand by firms at risk in this public-private 
collaborative arrangement.  
                                                 
24 This may be one reason that the White House Council of Economic Advisors (2007) devoted an entire 
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  TRIA  Extension of TRIA  
 2005  2006  2007 
Program trigger 
 (« per event » in 06-07)  $5 million  $50 million  $100 million 
Insurer’s deductible 
(% DEP previous year)  15% 17.5%  20% 
Federal share 
(% above insurers’ 
deductible) 




$15 billion  $25 billion  $27.5 billion 
Annual Program Cap 
 





Impact on two scenarios of attacks (five-ton truck bomb and 9/11 type)  
on workers’ compensation and P&C lines 
Simulations on the United States’ 447 largest commercial high-rise buildings 
 
 
This appendix provides the results of a series of simulations quantifying the effect on 
property damage and workers’ compensation losses of a five-ton truck bomb 
exploding in each of the United States’ 447 largest commercial high-rise buildings 
(Figure A1), along with the of a large commercial aircraft crashing against each of 
these buildings (A, B, C, etc) (Figure A2)
25. One reason for this focus is that A.M. 
Best uses the 5-ton truck bomb of scenario in analyzing the impact of a terrorist 
attack on insurers’ balance sheets.  
 
 
Figure A1.  Projected Property Losses and Workers’ Compensation Losses from 
                     Five-Ton Bomb Attacks to 447 High-Rise Buildings in the United States  
                     (in $ billion) 
  [Each triangle represents one specific high-rise building used in the simulation; 
  For example, triangles A, B, and C are three distinct buildings] 
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Figure A2.  Projected Property Losses and Workers’ Compensation (WC) Losses from 
                    Aircraft Attacks to 447 High-Rise Buildings in the United States (in $ billion)  
                      [Each triangle represents one specific high-rise building used in the simulation] 
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